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Where do goals come from? A Generic Approach
to Autonomous Goal-System Development
Matthias Rolf and Minoru Asada
Abstract—Goals express agents’ intentions and allow them to
organize their behavior based on low-dimensional abstractions
of high-dimensional world states. How can agents develop such
goals autonomously? This paper proposes a detailed conceptual
and computational account to this longstanding problem. We
argue to consider goals as high-level abstractions of lower-level
intention mechanisms such as rewards and values, and point
out that goals need to be considered alongside with a detection
of the own actions’ effects. We propose Latent Goal Analysis
as a computational learning formulation thereof, and show
constructively that any reward or value function can by explained
by goals and such self-detection as latent mechanisms. We first
show that learned goals provide a highly effective dimensionality
reduction in a practical reinforcement learning problem. Then,
we investigate a developmental scenario in which entirely task-
unspecific rewards induced by visual saliency lead to self and
goal representations that constitute goal-directed reaching.
Index Terms—Latent Goal Analysis, Goal Systems Develop-
ment, Self Detection, Recommender Systems, Dimension Reduc-
tion, Goal Babbling, Saliency
I. MOTIVATION
Goals are abstractions of high-dimensional world states that
express intelligent agents’ intentions underlying their actions.
Goals are considered to organize the behavior of both humans
and robots. For instance in robot planning [1] as well as motor
control [2], [3] goals describe the desired outcome of future
actions in terms of what aspect or variable in the world is
relevant and what its desired value is. Also in robot learning
goals have been proven useful as a scaffolding mechanism to
perform efficient exploration also in high dimensional sensori-
motor spaces [4], [5]. Yet, in all of these scenarios the goals are
carefully handcrafted: the variable to be controlled, as well as
a mechanism to select a particular goal of the agent at any time
need to be specified by the designer. Several formulations of
motor learning can automatically choose internal goals purely
for the sake of training a skill (e.g. [6], [5]), but they do neither
explain how to choose goals depending on external stimuli, nor
can they determine the variable that has to be controlled.
Goals are a fundamental concept also in neuroscience and
psychology. The entire formulation of the cerebellum provid-
ing internal forward and inverse models [7] only makes sense
if goals are already given as input for the inverse models. From
a conservative standpoint such models concern motor control
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in the first place. Recent theories, however, go much further
and suppose that they also contribute to cortex-wide higher-
level cognitive processes [8] and are engaged in social behav-
ior [9]. Goals are also seen as a major factor in motivation
psychology [10], where “goal-setting” is considered essential
for long term behavior organization. Goals are considered a
likewise structuring element in our cognition and perception
of other agents’ behavior such as in imitation learning [11] or
teleological action understanding [12], [13].
Goals are useful abstractions. But where do they come
from? Neither robotics and machine learning, nor neuro-
science, nor psychology provide conclusive or even general
hints how a biological or artificial agent that starts with no
goals can acquire them. Already Weng et al. [14] in 2001
pointed out that developmental robots should learn without
a particular task (i.e. explicit goals) given to them at first.
But then, how could they ever develop such abstractions?
The consequent need to consider the learning of goals was
explicitly pointed out firstly by Prince et al. [15] in 2005, but
is essentially unsolved ever since. It may not be difficult to
think of heuristics for an agent to acquire goals within isolated
special scenarios, but what could be general mechanisms for
a development of goal systems? This article seeks for answers
to this longstanding question. We thereby focus on (i) the
learning of an agent’s own goals, in contrast to observational
learning about others’ goals such as in imitation learning
[16], [17] or values such as in inverse reinforcement learning
[18], and (ii) a fully autonomous learning without external
supervision such as an agent being told what to do.
A. Overview
Our paper makes four contributions along with the next
four sections. Firstly, we develop a general conceptualization
of goals in Sec. II. We introduce several novel arguments
in order to define goals as precisely as possible, and argue
to consider goal systems as abstractions of reward systems.
These arguments are meant to stimulate a wider discussion
and provide the basis for our second contribution: In Sec.
III we introduce a computational learning formulation Latent
Goal Analysis (LGA). Based on given rewards we show how
“latent” goals can be extracted from the sensory and action
information and constructively prove the universal existence of
this transformation. Thirdly, we show an application oriented
experiment in Sec. IV. We use LGA as a dimension reduction
technique for reinforcement learning. In a “recommender” sce-
nario online news articles have to be recommended to readers.
We use goals learned by LGA as compact representations
of high-dimensional data that outperform standard methods
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Fig. 1: We argue to consider goals as abstractions of rewards and values.
applied in that field. Lastly, we show an experimental setup
to investigate the human development of goals for the case
of reaching in Sec. V. We show that this task-unspecific
information seeking reward based on visual saliency leads
to the representation of to-be-reached objects as goals and
a self-detection of the own hand. We thereby not only learn
those abstractions, but already utilize them by applying goal
babbling [19] to generate actions in a fully bootstrapping and
closed action-perception-learning loop.
II. WHAT IS A GOAL?
How can we operationalize the acquisition of goals? In
order to achieve a general conceptualization we start from
common sense as in dictionary definitions and relate that
meaning to usages in various scientific fields. Starting from
this general definition we distinguish goals from several related
terms such as optimization or affordances. Most importantly,
we point out several vague or entirely unspecified aspects in
the common sense usage of “goals” and make propositions
how to substantiate the terminology. We thereby aim at a
conceptualization that is both as general as possible and
concrete enough for a mathematical operationalization.
A. General Definition and Related Terms
Dictionaries refer to the term “goal” as “an aim or desired
result” of someone’s “ambition or effort”1, Goals are most
precisely defined in computational domains that use them. In
motor coordination and control [2], [3] goals are typically low-
dimensional abstractions of the task such as a desired angular
velocity of an electric motor or a desired position of a robot’s
end effector. Thereby goals are formulated as values in some
low-dimensional space (e.g. 1d velocities, 3d positions) in
which they abstract from many task-irrelevant variables (such
1oxforddictionaries.com “goal”; corresponding definitions in other lan-
guages: duden.de (German) “Ziel”; nlpwww.nict.go.jp/wn-ja/ (Japanese)
Synset 05980875-n; queried 2014/01/15
as room temperature) of the much higher-dimensional physical
processes. Also goals in planning [1] describe world variables
that should have some desired value, while other variables are
irrelevant. In both control and planning the goal has to be
achieved by means of action, i.e. the the agent has to find
actions that result in the observation of the desired variable
values. Similar aspects can also be found in goal-setting psy-
chology [10]: For instance in management psychology it has
been proposed that goals should be specific (have a particular
value), measurable, and realistic (i.e. achievable by means of
own action) [20]. The above points clearly distinguish goals
from two other kinds of desires or intentions: (i) Optimization
or general improvement (such as increasing reward) are not
goals in a narrow sense. “Improvement” for itself is not
specific in the sense that a particular to be achieved value is
specified. Hence, there is no definite achievement possible or
an end defined. (ii) Wishes of desired world states (e.g. having
a sunny say) are no goals because they are not achievable by
means of own action in the first place.
With these aspects we can attempt a first definition that we
will refine in the remainder of this section:
Definition: A goal is an equivalence set of world
states that, in a certain situation, an agent desires to
achieve as a result of its own action.
They refer to an equivalence set of states in the sense that
there can be irrelevant variables that to not matter for the
goal. Hence, any of their values are equivalently acceptable.
The main point is that goals reflect a particular desire. Their
achievement has some value to the agent. This stands in
contrast e.g. to affordances [21]. Sahin et al. formulated
affordances as the relation between the action of an agent, an
object under manipulation, and the effect on that object [22].
Objects with similar action-effect relations can then be sum-
marized in equivalence classes such as “standonable”. Related
to this formulation, contingencies [23], [24] and action-effect
bindings [25], [26] describe general relations between actions
and their specific effects. Goals and affordances are both
interactivist concepts that can not be defined by only the agent
or only the environment, but only via their interplay. The
crucial difference between them is that affordances describe
any possible thing that could be done. Affordances are not
associated to any value or desire, while this desire to do
something is the constituting aspect of goals in our view.
B. A Refined Concept of Goals
Intelligent organisms can not arbitrarily regard things as
goals while others are not regarded as goals. The biggest open
question about goals in our view is what kind of information
could lead to this differentiation between goals and non-goals.
This source of information, or learning signal, is consequently
the main point of our overall argumentation. In terms of
machine learning we know three basic kinds of learning
signals: supervised input of ground-truth values, unsupervised
learning of input statistics, and reward or cost signals in
reinforcement learning or optimization. Supervised learning as
source of information seems entirely unsuited for autonomous
development of goals, since a teacher for such information
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would have to be external. While social learning of goals in
such terms certainly exists, it does not provide answers for
an ontogenetic core mechanism of goal systems development.
Unsupervised learning seems likewise unsuited since signal
statistics can not tell about a desire or value. Rather, reward
signals seem to be the suitable learning signal, as they express
the most primitive form of a value. Considering goals as high-
level abstractions of intention therefore suggests to consider
them abstractions of world states that are associated to reward:
Proposition 1: Goals are abstractions that do not
themselves determine a desire, but rather describe
it based on lower-level systems of desire, such as
reward or value systems.
Corresponding rewards might reflect some task very directly
when e.g. determined in a social context, or directly as food.
However, they might also be purely internal or intrinsic as it is
often considered in the contexts of intrinsic motivation [27],
[28], [29], [30] or information seeking [31]. Our exemplary
experiment in Sec. V will take the latter perspective. The
abstraction process thereby could not only concern immediate
rewards, but also expected, future rewards that are expressed in
value systems (e.g. supposed to exist in the midbrain [32]). In
Fig. 1b we illustrate this proposition by saying the achievement
of a goal (the abstraction) “describes” an (expected) reward.
The second question we must clarify to conceptualize goals
is what “achievement” means. In natural language it is often
expressed that an “action achieves a goal”. However, this skips
an important aspect that must be considered for a profound
conceptualization: Goals do not come alone, but always paired
with an evaluation of the own action’s effect. It is the effect of
the action, not the action itself to which the goal is compared.
In robot reaching this evaluation, or rather its learning, is
often referred to as self-detection [33], [34]: the robot’s hand
needs to be detected for instance in a camera image. Just
in the case of reaching, this notion is related from “body
schema” [35] that describe a localization of the body in
general. Here we use the term self-detection also in a non-
reaching and non-spatial sense that describes any effect related
to a goal. For instance the goal of having a sandwich to eat
(e.g. followed by the verbal action “make me a sandwich”)
would be accompanied by the detection of actually having a
sandwich or not. The evaluation of the action equally exists
in planning (e.g. navigation) domains, where the effect of past
action is compared to the desired outcome, and goal-setting
psychology, where a major emphasis is made on measurability
of goals. In all of these domains the effect of the own action
(self-detection) is then compared to the goal within a common
reference frame in order to assess the achievement. The need
for this comparison forbids considering the development of
goals and self-detection separately from each other:
Proposition 2: Goals cannot be learned or considered
independently from self-detection, but both have to
describe a consistent reference frame in which the
goal can be compared to the outcome of an action.
This aspect will largely guide our computational formalization.
Our experiments will also illustrate that this aspect poses
an important developmental hallmark: the entrance of self-
supervised action and motor learning. Once self-detection and
goals are available, a supervised learning signal becomes avail-
able to other learning processes. When self-detection (e.g. a
robot’s forward function) and goals were already available they
have been used in numerous approaches for motor learning
already [3]. With respect to the autonomous development of
goals already Prince [15] noted that goals are related to self-
supervision, but missed the point that it is not the goals
themselves, but rather the self-detection (in relation to the
goals) that enables the supervision.
Finally, we need to consider how goals become “active”,
i.e. how an agent determines which goal to follow at a
present moment. It is often considered that agents can have
multiple goals, e.g. on different timescales or also parallel
or secondary goals in the long run. This leaves a lot of
play for an operationalization, which we propose to organize
with the following restriction using the notion of cognitive or
processing “(sub-)systems” internal to an agent:
Proposition 3: One system can have only one (ac-
tive) goal at a time, which expresses the present
desire based on an internal or sensory context.
Hence, different systems of cognitive processing (e.g. organiz-
ing different timescales of behavior) or motor planning and
control can have one present goal each. Further we note that a
goal gets triggered by a context, such as sensory information,
an internal state or information from other processing systems.
This seems trivial but makes an important point: there needs
to be a goal-detection to determine the now to be followed
goal from the context, and that parallels the self-detection. In
the reaching example this might be a mechanism to determine
the position of the relevant object from camera images, or also
hard-wired position selectors in many robot setups. In terms
of motivational psychology, for instance a certain context of a
conversation might trigger a subsequent communicational goal
such as to convey an information (“by the way...”).
In summary, we refer to a goal system as the joint apparatus
of goal-detection from a context and self-detection that are
compared within a common reference frame, such that the
achievement of the goal by means of own action is reflected
by a reward or value (see Fig. 1b).
III. LATENT GOAL ANALYSIS
In the last section we have established a conceptual frame-
work of goals and argued to learn them together with self-
detection as abstractions of reward or value signals. In order
to develop a mathematical learning framework, we now have
to set those terms in a formal relation. The best way to do so
is to consider a domain which already has a formal relation
of at least most of the conceptual elements, such as control or
coordination problems [2], [3], [4]. In this section we develop
our computational learning framework for goals by introducing
this set of formal relations, adding terms from the concept that
are still missing (Sec. III-A), and then establishing a learning
rule from rewards to mathematical terms corresponding to each
of the conceptual terms (Sec. III-B). In order to establish a
generic framework we will not make any assumptions about
the source of rewards, but will show examples for extrinsic
(Sec. IV) and intrinsic (Sec. V) rewards in the experiments.
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(a) Motor control with internal models.
Action space A
r = r(c,a)  Reward3
Context space C
(b) One-step reinforcement learning. (c) Latent goal analysis (LGA).
Fig. 2: Latent goal analysis (LGA) identifies how to project actions and contexts into a common observation space. The observed rewards r are thereby
explained by distance between action-outcome x (self-detection) and goal x∗ (goal-detection), such that a reward problem is turned into a control problem.
It can be argued that starting from such a particular domain
as motor control considerably narrows the scope of the overall
concept. However, we will show in this section the universality
of this mathematical approach, i.e. that it can learn goals
from any reward or value function. Specifically, we show an
equivalence relation between motor control and reinforcement
learning, such that any reinforcement learning problem can be
transformed into a motor control problem with its abstractions
for goals and self-detection. Hence, our learning framework is
as general as reinforcement learning, which is often considered
the most general learning formulation at all.
A. Reward Transformation
We start by establishing a formal relation of the conceptual
terms based on motor control or coordination problems used
in contexts of robot control [2] and learning based on internal
models [7], [3], [19], [5]. Motor control problems as shown in
Fig. 2(a) follow a simple protocol: (1): The world provides a
goal x∗ to the agent that is situated in some observation space
X⊆Rn. (2): The agent chooses an action a from some action
space A ⊆ Rm. (3): The world provides a causal outcome
f(a)=x of the agent’s action, again situated in X. The agent’s
task is to choose an action such that the outcome x matches
the goal x∗: x = f(a) = x∗. Many coordination problems
provide redundancy: the action space is substantially higher
dimensional than the observation space (n  m), such that
multiple actions ai 6=aj map to same outcome f(ai)=f(aj).
In such scenarios additional cost functions −ea(a) are often
considered [2] to select an optimal action among all those that
fulfill f(a)=x∗. In the case of hand-eye coordination a could
correspond to joint angles or torques. x=f(a) is the position
of the end-effector that results from applying a. The ground
truth function f : A→ X is called forward function. When
this function is learned from supervised examples it is called
forward model. The task to identify it (without supervision) is
called self-detection [34]. The agent’s selection of an action
is addressed with an inverse model (see Fig. 2(a)) that is an
inverse function of the forward model [7], [36]. This problem
is often considered by means of an overall cost-function of
the distance of goal and outcome, and ea(a), which is easily
transformed into reward semantics by inverting the sign:
r(x∗,a) = −||x∗ − f(a)||2 + ea(a) (1)
What is still missing in this formulation is the goal-detection.
This mechanism is not usually part of academic papers about
motor control, yet always present: The goals of control pro-
cesses are chosen by vision processes identifying relevant
objects to be manipulated, planning- or other processes that are
usually hard-wired. Hence, they are in some way determined
by a larger internal or external context. We can denote this
selection on an abstract level with a function h(c), which we
refer to as goal-detection. Further, we introduce for the sake
of symmetry a virtual cost term ec(c) that only depends on
the context, and which we will later need for our theoretical
considerations. This term does not influence the optimal action
selection for a given context, but introduces the aspect that the
optimally possible reward depends on the context. Altogether
this gives the reward transformation
r(c,a) = −||h(c)− f(a)||2 + ec(c) + ea(a) . (2)
The overall protocol now corresponds to a one-step reinforce-
ment problem [37], [38] as shown in Fig. 2(b): (1): The world
provides a context c in some context space C ⊆ Rp. (2): The
agent chooses an action a from the action space A ⊆ Rm.
(3): The world provides a reward r ∈ R based on latent goals
and action outcomes as in equation 2.
B. Latent Goal Transformation
We have now established a formal relation between all terms
in our concept. Yet, so far this formulation only allows to
transform existing goals into rewards. The central idea for
computational learning of goals is now to invert this process.
Given any possible reward or value function, is it possible to
transform in back into a motor control problem?
In fact, this should not be possible according to common be-
liefs about reinforcement learning: Motor control comes with
highly informative and usually low-dimensional abstractions
that can be used for supervised learning [7], [3]. Goal and
actual values in motor control define a relation similar (see
[36]) to actual and target outputs in classical supervised learn-
ing setups by providing “directional information” in contrast
to a mere “magnitude of an error” in reinforcement learning
[39]. Given this rich structure in motor control, reinforcement
learning seems the by far more general setup [40], [41].
Yet, we now show that in fact any reinforcement problem
can be turned into a motor control problem, and thereby goals
and self-detection can be retrieved as abstractions from a
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reward signal. Therefore we need to find functions fˆ , hˆ, eˆc
and eˆa to resemble any possible reward function r(c,a):
r(c,a) = rˆ(c,a) = −||hˆ(c)− fˆ(a)||2 + eˆc(c) + eˆa(a) , (3)
or value function Q(c,a) expressing expected future rewards:
Q(c,a) = Qˆ(c,a) = −||hˆ(c)− fˆ(a)||2 + eˆc(c) + eˆa(a)
This work does not tackle the temporal credit assignment
problem to estimate Q itself. However, if a value system
[32], [42] to estimate future rewards Q is already available,
decomposing either r(c,a) or Q(c,a) is computationally
equivalent since both are scalar functions of c and a.
The major challenge is to identify the forward model by
self-detection fˆ(a) = xˆ, and the goal-detection hˆ(c) = xˆ∗.
Thereby goals and outcomes are considered latent variables of
the reward function. These abstractions constitute the control
problem by describing the interaction of goals and outcomes
in a low-dimensional observation space (see Fig. 2(c)). Cost
terms depending on context or action only are considered as
remainders, and in fact are easy to find given fˆ and hˆ.
a) Ansatz: Finding such functions can be formulated
as finding appropriate coefficients of parametrized functions.
First, we consider features ψc(c) : C→Rp′ and ψa(a) : A→
Rm′ to describe the contexts and actions. Assuming an n-
dimensional observation space X we can denote our function
candidates with coefficients M, H, Ra, and Rc as:
xˆ∗ = hˆ(c) = H ·Ψc(c) , H ∈ Rn×p′
xˆ = fˆ(a) = M ·Ψa(a) , M ∈ Rn×m′
eˆc(c) = Ψc(c)
T ·Rc ·Ψc(c) , Rc ∈ Rp′×p′
eˆa(a) = Ψa(a)
T ·Ra ·Ψa(a) , Ra ∈ Rm′×m′ .
When we insert these definitions into Eqn. 3 we can write the
reward transformation of a control problem in matrix notation
rˆ(c,a)=
(
ψc(c)
ψa(a)
)T(
Rc-HTH HTM
MTH Ra-MTH
)(
ψc(c)
ψa(a)
)
(4)
as a quadratic form of context- and action-features.
b) Observation Space Reconstruction: We can now write
the actual reward function r(c,a) in a similar form by
r(c,a) =
(
ψc(c)
ψa(a)
)T
·K ·
(
ψc(c)
ψa(a)
)
=
(
ψc(c)
ψa(a)
)T(
Kc,c Kc,a
KTc,a Ka,a
)(
ψc(c)
ψa(a)
)
. (5)
This form with a symmetric coefficient matrix K is a universal
approximator: it can arbitrarily well approximate at least all
continuous functions if appropriate features ψ are chosen. For
instance, if the features ψa and ψc are separate polynomial
features of a and c up to polynomial degree d, then just the
subterm ψc(c)T ·Kc,a ·ψa(a) will contain all joint polynomial
terms of a and c up to degree d. Hence, equation 5 can at least
describe all functions that can be described by polynomials,
which are at least all continuous functions.
We can now find coefficients M, H, Ra, and Rc by
matching equations 4 and 5. Starting from the need to match
Kc,a = H
TM, we can see that it is not only always possible
to transform rewards into goals and outcomes, but it is even
under-determined. There are infinitely many decompositions
HTM for any matrix Kc,a. For any choice of H and M, a
perfect match r= rˆ can be generated by the residual terms
Rc = Kc,c +H
TH and Ra = Ka,a +MTM .
For a concrete decomposition of Kc,a we can consider its
singular value decomposition USVT with orthonormal ma-
trices U,V and a positive diagonal matrix S. An exemplary
decomposition could be to set H = S
1
2UT and M = S
1
2VT .
Still, the resulting observation space X, in which fˆ : A→X and
hˆ : C→X map actions and contexts, is very high-dimensional
with min(p′,m′) dimensions, since Kc,a ∈ Rp′×m′ . However,
a dimension reduction is now straightforward based on the
SVD: we can select the diagonal matrix S′ ∈ Rn×n with the
n largest singular values of Kc,a and their respective singular
vectors in U′ ∈ Rp′×n and V′ ∈ Rm′×n to approximate
Kc,a ≈ U′S′V′T = HTM. H ∈ Rn×p′ and M ∈ Rn×m′
can be chosen within the column space of U′ and V′ in order
to project into the n-dimensional observation space. Hence, the
latent observation space can be uniquely determined for any
number of dimensions n, except for multiple identical singular
values. For sufficiently large n, LGA then approximates the
reward function arbitrarily well.
c) Optimal Self- and Goal-Detection: While the selec-
tion of the observation space is uniquely determined by the
column space of U′ and V′, the positioning of goals and
outcomes inside that space, i.e. the precise choice of H and
M, is not unique. We can choose both matrices by means of
any transformation matrices Pc,Pa ∈ Rn×n
H = Pc ·U′T , M = Pa ·V′T , that satisfy
PTc Pa=S
′ ⇒ HTM=U′PTc PaV′T =U′S′V′T .
We can see our options by representing Pa by its singular
value decomposition with orthonormal matrices u,v ∈ Rn×n
and positive diagonal matrix s ∈ Rn×n:
Pa = usv
T ⇒ Pc = us−1vTS′ .
Using this notation it is easy to show that u is irrelevant. If
we insert the above definitions into the reward equation 4, we
can see that u only appears as uTu. Since u is orthonormal
we get uTu=1n in any case and can set u=1n right away.
This reflects that a rotation of the entire observation space
does not change distances in that space, and therefore does not
matter for LGA. It remains to choose an orthonormal matrix
v ∈ Rn×n and a positive diagonal matrix s ∈ Rn×n. v and
s together determine how actions and contexts are precisely
projected into the observation space as goals hˆ(c) = xˆ∗ and
action-outcomes fˆ(a)= xˆ. Interestingly, xˆ∗ and xˆ are thereby
scaled “against” each other: Increasing s results in scaling up
xˆ, but scaling down xˆ∗ because of the appearance of s−1 in H.
This operation largely modifies the distance between xˆ∗ and xˆ,
and therefore the value of −||xˆ∗− xˆ||2. Nevertheless this does
not change the overall reward function rˆ, but shifts parameter
“mass” between its different terms −||hˆ(c) − fˆ(a)||2, eˆc(c),
and eˆa(a). Therefore also the contribution of rewards to rˆ by
these different terms is changed by the choice of v and s. Of
6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTONOMOUS MENTAL DEVELOPMENT (UNDER REVIEW)
course, −||xˆ∗ − xˆ||2 is the most relevant term in LGA, since
it reflects the relation between goals and outcomes as main
constituents of the control problems. Therefore it should have
the most significant contribution to rˆ, while the cost terms
eˆc(c) and eˆa(a) should rather be residuals. Hence, we can
choose v and s such that eˆc(c) and eˆa(a) are minimal, which
we can formulate with l2 norms of the matrices Rc and Ra:
v∗, s∗ = argmin
v,s
(ER) = argmin
v,s
(‖Rc‖2 + ‖Ra‖2)
This formulation involves the high-dimensional matrices Rc
and Ra, but can be boiled down to an equivalent lower-
dimensional problem. Inserting the definitions of H, M based
on v and s gives
Rc = Kc,c +U
′S′vs−2vTS′U′T and
Ra = Ka,a +V
′vs2vTV′T .
v and s can only affect Rc and Ra within the subspace
spanned by U′ and V′. Hence, we can equivalently consider
their n-dimensional projections
R(n)c = U
′TKc,cU′ + S′vs−2vTS′ and
R(n)a = V
′TKa,aV′ + vs2vT ,
and minimize the respective error, such that
v∗, s∗ = argmin
v,s
(E
(n)
R )=argmin
v,s
(
‖R(n)c ‖2+‖R(n)a ‖2
)
.
We are currently not aware of a closed form solution to
this optimization problem. It is low-dimensional, though. In
practice we found that it can be solved both efficiently and very
effectively by simple gradient descent. Therefore we initialize
v = s = 1n and apply gradient descent on E
(n)
R with a step
width of 0.001 until numeric convergence. Thereby only the
diagonal values of s are considered, and v is orthonormalized
by setting its singular values to 1 after each update.
C. Algorithm Summary and Interpretation
Altogether, LGA starts which a universal approximation of
the reward or value (i.e. future expected reward) function
function in the quadratic form shown in equation 5. This
mechanism corresponds to value systems supposed to exist in
midbrain structures [32], [42], whereas the reward itself could
reflect any extrinsic or intrinsic phenomenon.
The second step is the SVD of Kc,a. Here we select the axis
in column and row space that have the highest singular values.
This corresponds to the axis of inside the action- and context
space that are most significant to the reward/value function.
Hence, this step identifies the low-dimensional observation
space in which goals and action outcomes are situated.
The third and last step is to actually locate goals and action
outcomes inside the observation space. Therefore we assemble
the matrices H and M for goal- and self-detection out of the
terms v and s. This directly gives the functions hˆ(c) and fˆ(a)
and allows to compute eˆc(c) and eˆa(a) if needed.
We have argued on a purely conceptual level that goals
should be considered as abstractions of reward signals. La-
tent Goal Analysis provides the computational tool for this
idea. Thereby goals and outcomes are considered latent vari-
ables of the reward function, which allows to view them as
compact low-dimensional representations of otherwise high-
dimensional actions and world states. These representations
thereby do justice to the semantics of desire and intention
by expressing aspects relevant to reward, and do justice to
the achievement semantics by representing both in a com-
mon space in which they are compared. In the following
experiments we will exemplify all of these aspects, and the
universality of the approach, by showing (i) a dimension
reduction application based on external rewards in Sec. IV,
and (ii) a developmental study with generic and intrinsic
information seeking rewards in Sec. V in which highly in-
terpretable representations are learned, and used to bootstrap
self-supervised motor learning.
IV. EXPERIMENT: DIMENSION REDUCTION IN NEWS
ARTICLE RECOMMENDATION
Our computational learning formulation shows that goals
can be learned as abstractions of rewards. The algorithm itself
is in the first place meant to show the feasibility of this
approach. However, since the formulation is based on spectral
decomposition we can immediately apply it for dimensionality
reduction of reward-based learning problems. Our first exper-
iment therefore investigates this ability, for which we take a
very practical scenario. Here, the “task” is in fact already
given by means of extrinsic rewards. We will show that learned
goals can serve as very useful and compact representations
of such externally given tasks. We will contrast this external
specification in Sec. V where we investigate purely intrinsic
rewards that to not immediately describe any task.
Our experiment investigates LGA’s capability for dimension
reduction in a one-step reinforcement learning problem. This
scenario considers a website comprising a certain set A(t)
of news articles at each time. One article can be featured, i.e.
recommended, at a prominent position on the website. The task
is to select which article’s teaser (action a∈A(t)) should be
on the featured position. A recommender system is supposed
to select these actions such that the probability that the website
visitor interacts with it (e.g. clicks on the teaser, or purchases a
good) is maximized, such that the earning of the operating web
company rise in the end. In order to perform such selection
specific to the visitor, there is in many cases information like
country, age, or previous click-history (context c) available
due to IP-address, cookies, and a login at the website. With
such information a reward function r(c,a) can be estimated
that resembles the click probability. Dimensionality reduction,
however, is crucial in this domain: both context and action are
typically very high-dimensional, but any recommender system
must react extremely quickly to thousands or millions of visits
of a webpage. This can only be achieved if the dimension of c
and a is reduced to allow for an efficient evaluation of r(c,a).
Dimension reduction in reinforcement learning is a tedious
issue. One attempt has been to learn reduced rank regression
of transition probabilities to guide exploration [43], but which
can not directly consider the features’ relevance to reward
achievement. Purely unsupervised schemes like PCA, or slow-
feature analysis [44] are frequently applied for state-space
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dimension reduction, but also cannot account for the actual
reward-relevance. Reward-modulated versions of such learning
rules [45] can account for the reward-relevance at least to
some extent, but are limited to simple correlations. None of
these methods can effectively reduce the dimension of actions
because actions do not have a naturally observable probability
distribution (except when expert demonstrations are given
[46]). The only models that can consider states, actions, and
reward at the same time estimate the reward function based
on bi-linear regression and reduce the rank of the parameter
matrix [47], [48], [49]. From a perspective of dimension
reduction only, these models are similar to our approach,
although coming from an entirely different direction. We will
show experimentally that our method yields significantly more
compact representations in a practical scenario [50].
A. Material and Method
For this experiment we use the “Yahoo! Front Page Today
Module User Click Log Dataset, version 2.0” [50], which
comprises recordings of the click behavior on yahoo.com’s
front page from 15 consecutive days in October 2011, from
which we utilize the first day of recordings only. This record-
ing contains a total number of T = 1.607.525 events. Each
event contains the actually displayed news-teaser, the set of
currently available news, a set of visitor features, and the
visitor’s decision to click on the teaser (r=1) or not (r=0).
49 different teasers have been shown in this period, which we
represent as m = 49 dimensional actions a encoded with a
“1-of-m” scheme. The events contain a total number of 116
binary features about the visitor, which are fully anonymized
in the data, i.e. their individual meanings are not revealed by
Yahoo. Using this data, we estimate K using batch-gradient
descent on the empirical error E[(rˆ(c,a,K)−r)2]. We applied
10000 epochs of training with a gradient step width 0.01
starting from zero initial parameters. After that the parameters
were fine-tuned by applying a whitening on the contexts and
continuing batch regression for another 1000 epochs with step
width 0.0001.
As a baseline, we applied a bi-linear regression model
rˆ(c,a) = ψc(c)
T ·B ·ψa(a) that was trained with the same
procedure as the quadratic model. Such bi-linear regression
(BLR) models have previously [47], [48] been used to reduce
the dimension in recommender scenarios: the matrix B can be
decomposed into UBSBVTB by singular value decomposition,
after which only the n most significant dimensions are kept.
This decomposition allows to rewrite rˆ as
rˆ(c,a) =
(
S
1
2
BU
T
B · ψc(c)
)T
·
(
S
1
2
BV
T
B · ψa(a)
)
Very similar to the LGA approach, this method can be in-
terpreted as projecting contexts and actions into a common
space, which has been referred to “partworth” space [49].
In this space, the comparison is done by a scalar product,
whereas LGA measures a direct distance. The “partworth”
space therefore does not encode goals because they cannot be
definitely achieved (the scalar product is not bounded). The
evaluation cost for both models is the same: both involve
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Fig. 3: Results for the Yahoo! Webscope R6B data set. Estimated normalized
click-through rates for LGA, BLR decomposition, and PCA depending on the
number of selected components.
matrix-vector multiplications of the same size; the square-
distance in LGA is only exactly one floating point operation
more expensive than the scalar product. As further baselines
we used PCA to reduce the dimension of the context-space
before applying either quadratic or bi-linear regression. In the
PCA condition the dimension of actions cannot be reduced.
B. Results
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of each technique
we need a domain specific evaluation metric, i.e. how many
visitors’ clicks both approaches can generate. For each method
we can denote the policy to choose a news-teaser a based
on the user information c as pi(c) = argmaxa∈A(t) rˆ(c,a),
where A(t) is the set of articles available at the time t of
the page visit. A natural performance metric then is the click-
through rate CTRpi =N+pi /N , where N is the total number
of page visits and N+pi is the number of clicks generated
by selecting teasers with pi. Yet, this measure can only be
thoroughly measured when the policy is run online on the
webpage. For an offline evaluation [49] we can estimate the
performance by counting how often an actually clicked teaser
would have been also recommended by the policy:
nCTR =
CTRpi
CTR%
≈ |{rt = 1 ∧ at = pi(ct)}|∑
t(rt · |A(t)|−1)
,
which is baselined against the performance CTR% of a
uniform random strategy. Fig. 3 shows that LGA achieves
a substantially better performance than the bi-linear model
decomposition (BLR-SVD). In fact, already n=0 components
for LGA, which corresponds to only evaluating eˆa(a), suffice
to reach a factor of 2.06 compared to chance level. This
reflects the simple fact that some articles are more interesting
than others. LGA then quickly improves to nCTR > 2.25
for n≥ 5 components and further improves to nCTR> 2.3.
The bi-linear model requires n ≥ 8 components to reach
only nCTR > 2.15 with only minimal further improvement
for more components. It might be considered unfair to allow
the eˆa(a) term for LGA, whereas the bi-linear models do
neither comprise nor require such an additional measure. In
the recommender scenario, however, it is reasonable because
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eˆa(a) only needs to be computed once when an article is
published. The cost for evaluating the policy on a page visit
is the same, since both LGA and BLR need to multiply the
visitor context with a (n × p) matrix. LGA then computes
a distance in n dimension and BLR a scalar product in n
dimensions, which also has the same cost. However, in this
particular setup LGA achieves equally high performance (for
n>0) when the cost term is omitted (see Fig. 3). Both LGA
and bi-linear decomposition outperform their counterparts
with unsupervised PCA on the states before running bi-linear
(BLR) or quadratic (QR) regression. Interestingly, PCA&QR
substantially outperforms the standard BLR decomposition
approach, which shows the high expressiveness of quadratic
regression in general. PCA&QR has, however, an increased
cost of evaluating rˆ(c,a) for a new context: O(n2 +n · p)
instead of O(n+n·p) for all other methods. LGA still extracts
more compact representations from the quadratic regressor and
outperforms PCA&QR.
C. Discussion
We can conclude that LGA allows for an effective dimen-
sionality reduction in the online news recommender setup, in
which it outperforms the standard bi-linear model in terms of
generated clicks. The margin is thereby numerically not very
high in the range of 5-10%, but which is still highly significant
to the domain since clicks are directly related to a website’s
monetary income. Other studies on recommender systems
have reported much higher absolute values of CTR for other
benchmarks, which suggests that the data set used here is
rather hard. A possible reason is that there are no features
for the actions, but only identities. Features to relate similar
articles could therefore further increase both the absolute CTR
as well as the margin between different methods.
Goals seem to be useful abstractions in this setup. Within
our framework goals and action outcomes serve as low-
dimensional, compact representations of what defines the
reward. In this particular case, though, it is impossible to
interpret the goals’ semantics, simply for the reason that we do
not know the meaning of the context features and the content
of the articles, all of which had been previously anonymized. If
we would know them, however, we could interpret the learned
observation space as a space of different topics of interest of
users. From the webserver’s perspective the user (its context
c) comes with a topic of interest that is described as goal in
this space. The webserver has to-be-shown articles as actions
which are described in the topic space by means of action
outcomes: the “result” of choosing a particular article is to hit a
certain point in the interest space. The achievement semantics
describe that if both match, the user is interested and likely
to generate a reward (click) to the system.
V. EXPERIMENT: GOAL DEVELOPMENT IN REACHING
In the last section we have shown that LGA can extract goals
as useful abstractions from extrinsic rewards which already
specify a concrete task. But how could an agent learn goals
when the task is not that explicitly or not at all given already
in the beginning? In this section we contrast the previous
(a) Arm image, saliency, smoothed saliency
Latent Goal Analysis
Goal Babbling
Goal-Detection Self-DetectionAction
World
Context
Saliency
Reward
Self-supervisionScaffolding
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Motivation
Representation
Learning
Learning Action Selection
(b) Schematic organization of the experiment
Fig. 4: We consider saliency to generate an information seeking reward, from
which LGA learns representations that are used by Goal Babbling.
experiment with intrinsic rewards that do not describe any
particular task. We consider visual saliency as a reward for a
simple robot arm to implement information seeking behavior
[31] and show that it leads to meaningful goal- and self-
representations. Saliency measures have already been shown
to permit a self-detection of the own end-effector [51], simply
because looking at the own hand is “interesting”. Here we
extend this finding by considering an object at the same time.
It turns out that more interesting than looking at the hand or
the object is to look at both closely together (compare Fig.
5a(b) top and bottom). We show that LGA thereby develops
a detection of an external object as goal, and a self-detection
of the own hand. These representations are thereby already
utilized by means of goal babbling [4] in a closed loop, which
results in the emergence of goal-directed reaching.
A. Setup
The basic scenario is shown in Fig. 4. We consider a simple
robot arm with three joints (segment length 1/3 each), such
that actions are the joint angles at ∈ R3. We refer to the
effector’s actual position (that is at no time explicitly known
the learner) in cartesian coordinates as xt∈R2. A salient object
is placed somewhere in the scene at coordinates ot∈R2. Arm
and object together are rendered into a 48x48 pixel image.
Generically we could think of this image as context in terms of
visual perception. However, considering raw 2300 dimensional
visual input for learning is neither computationally feasible nor
very biologically plausible. For this experiment we assume a
certain extent of image processing that has already identified
the object and hand coordinates as keypoints in this image. The
context for learning comprises these basic coordinates plus
ROLF & ASADA: WHERE DO GOALS COME FROM? A GENERIC APPROACH TO AUTONOMOUS GOAL-SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 9
additional noise dimensions to challenge learning. At every
timestep t the agent is assumed to be still in position xt−1,
with the object at position ot. Hence, the learner’s context
is ct = (ot;xt−1; ε) ∈ R6 with gaussian noise ε ∈ R2, εi ∼
N (0.5, 0). For the to be estimated functions hˆ, fˆ , eˆc, and eˆa we
use a locally-linear learning formulation identical to [19] with
receptive field radii 2.0, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.5 respectively. As a
design choice we selected n= 2 components to be extracted
from the 6 dimensional context and 3 dimensional action.
Reward: The learner’s reward rt is computed using a
simple saliency model based on difference-of-gaussians (sim-
plified from Itti’s model [52]). After the agent has received the
context ct (containing an image of the old action at−1) and
selected a new action at, we compute a reward based on the
“after-action” image containing the object and the new action
at. Then, we compute a pyramid of gaussians: The image is
smoothed with a 5x5 gaussian kernel and scaled down by a
factor of 2. This procedure is repeated 4 times. The saliency
map (Fig. 4(a), middle) is computed out of these 5 images
(original & 4x smoothed) by taking the the difference between
any two of them, and adding up the amplitudes of those
differences. Considering the most salient point would mean to
look at the most interesting pixel. However, we assume that
the agent does not just attend to a single visual receptor but
rather a region in the visual scene. Therefore we smooth the
saliency map on a large scale (Fig. 4(a), right) with a gaussian
filter with σ= 10 pixels width which models the total width
of the agent’s visual field. The highest value of this smoothed
saliency therefore measures how much information the agent
can have in its visual field. We manually normalized the scale
of these values such that they approximately lie in a range
[0; 1] and consider these the rewards rt.
Online Learning Algorithm: For this experiment we
developed an online algorithm for LGA. While the previously
introduced algorithm is useful to show the theoretic feasibility
of LGA and for batch processing, it is not suited for the
closed loop processing intended in this experiment. Here
we use a simple gradient descent algorithm to estimate the
goal- and self-detection directly (as opposed to learning a
full reward r(c,a) model first). We consider an agent that
observes samples along time t. The agent perceives a context
ct, executes an action at, and receives a reward rt=r(ct,at)
based on a hidden reward function r(c,a). The agent is
supposed to learn the functions hˆ, fˆ , eˆc, and eˆa such that the
observed reward rt is explained by them according to Eqn. 3.
This can be done by reducing the reward-prediction error:
Et(rt, ct,at) = ||et(rt, ct,at)||2 = ||rt − rˆ(ct,at)||2 .
We denote the learnable parameters of hˆ, fˆ , eˆc, and eˆa as θh,
θf , θc and θa respectively. For an initial symmetry-breaking
(due to the invariance of internal rotation and translation) it
is necessary to initialize θh and θf with small random values.
From this point on, simple gradient descent on E can succeed
to estimate the functions. However, we need to consider that
the values of eˆc and eˆa have to be kept small. For this purpose
we use a simple decay term similar to weight-decay often used
in neural networks: parameter values are not only adapted by
the error-reduction signal, but also by a decay of some ∈ [0; 1)
portion of their value. Since any reward mass that decays from
eˆc and eˆa needs to be explained by ||hˆ−fˆ || instead, we add
(reverse sign) the decay values to the learning signals of hˆ and
fˆ . The resulting gradient rule with rates ηd and ηc is:
∆θf = +ηd ·
(
et+· [eˆa(at)+eˆc(ct)]
)·(xˆ∗t−xˆt)· ∂fˆ(at)∂θf
∆θh = −ηd ·
(
et+· [eˆa(at)+eˆc(ct)]
)·(xˆ∗t−xˆt)· ∂hˆ(ct)∂θh
∆θa = ηc · (et −  · eˆa(at)) · ∂eˆa(at)
∂θa
∆θc = ηc · (et −  · eˆc(ct)) · ∂eˆc(ct)
∂θc
,
in which the last term in each formula is depending on the
function approximation method. If the decay term is disabled
(=0), these formulas correspond to ordinary gradient descent
on E. The decay term balances the contribution of all terms
such that goal- and self-detection take the dominating role
in explaining the reward. The term −||hˆ−fˆ ||2 can, however,
not model arbitrary reward functions alone. In particular, this
negative distance can only account for numerically negative
rewards. Modeling numerically positive rewards requires the
terms eˆc and eˆa to shift the entire estimate rˆ by a constant. If
the decay term is used this process can never fully reach the
necessary shift. In order to still permit a reasonable learning
signal for hˆ and fˆ , we introduce a new and purely scalar term
k into the reward estimation. This term is not effected by the
decay, but can shift the reward estimate such that −||hˆ−fˆ ||2
can be used to model the shape of the reward function:
rˆ(c,a) = −||hˆ(c)− fˆ(a)||2 + eˆc(c) + eˆa(a) + k
∆k = ηc · et
In this experiment we utilize only hˆ and fˆ , whereas eˆa could
potentially be used to select cost-optimal actions for the same
goal. The term eˆc (and k) is not directly useful, but needs to
accompany the estimation when approximating any possible
reward function as shown in Sec. III.
Procedure: We conducted this experiment with 5 inde-
pendent trials with t=106 samples each. During a continuous
movement of the object in the visual scene we performed
continuous online learning of the LGA with learning rates
ηd = 0.015, ηc = 0.005, and  = 0.05. While the entire
procedure is possible in an online fashion only, we decided to
perform an additional consolidation phase to speed up learn-
ing. Therefore the generation of new samples is interrupted
every epoch of 1.000 samples, and the last 10.000 samples
are presented in random ordering 10 more times.
LGA describes how an agent can learn internal represen-
tations of goals and self. It does not instantaneously describe
a strategy to select actions. However, we can use the goal-
and self-detection to perform self-supervised motor learning:
the executed actions at and estimated outcomes xˆt = fˆ(at)
allow to generate a supervised learning signal for common
methods of motor learning [3], that can be used together with
the estimated goal xˆ∗t = hˆ(ct) to perform goal-directed motor-
control. Here we utilize a previous algorithm for goal babbling
[19], that also utilizes the goals in order to scaffold learning.
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(a) During learning, the system develops from initially no coordination (left) to 1d reaching (middle) to 2d reaching (right).
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(b) The self-detection encodes the hand position.
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(c) The goal-detection encodes the object position.
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(d) Hand-object contact rate via the inverse model.
Fig. 5: Goal- and self-detection learn to represent the object and hand position respectively. The first principal component in the internal coordinate system
encodes the top-down coordinate. Goal babbling uses these abstractions to learn an inverse model that consistently makes contact with the object.
This algorithm learns an inverse model g: xˆ∗ 7→ a from self-
generated examples (xˆt,at). The actions are selected by trying
to accomplish the goal by means of the inverse model plus
some exploratory noise Nt: at = g(xˆ∗t ) +Nt(xˆ
∗
t ). For this
we use a learning rate 0.02, local model distances 0.15 and
exploratory noise with amplitude 0.15 (see [19]).
The entire organization of the experiment is shown in
Fig. 4(b). The world provides an object that gets encoded in
the context together with the agent’s last action. The agent’s
saliency system generates an intrinsic reward for information
seeking. Latent Goal Analysis extracts the reward-relevant
information from the action (self-detection) and disentangles
the goal from other information in the context in order to
explain the reward by the relation between goal and self. Self-
detection and estimated goals are then used for self-supervised
goal babbling in a closed loop.
B. Results
We ran an evaluation of every 1.000 samples between
two consolidation steps. We investigated three questions: (i)
What does the self-detection encode? (ii) What does the
goal-detection encode? (iii) What behavior results from that
abstractions? In order to investigate (i) and (ii) we checked
how well the internal representations of outcomes xˆ and goals
xˆ∗ describe values of the actual effector position x and object
position o. Even if the internal variables encode them perfectly
there can be arbitrary shifts and translations in the internal
coordinate system. Therefore we computed the best linear
fit L from internal representations to actual variables. We
assessed the quality of the encoding by the normalized root-
mean-square error (NRMSE)
√
E [||Lx(xˆ)− x||2]/
√
V ar [x]
(correspondingly for xˆ∗ and o). If this error is 0, the value of
the actual variable can be perfectly (linearly) predicted from
the internal one: the internal representation encodes the actual
variable. A value of 1.0 means that the prediction gives an
error in the range of the variable’s variance, which indicates
that the internal variable does not encode the actual one at all.
Results for the self-detection are shown in Fig. 5b. Learning
a representation of the robot’s own hand requires a strongly
non-linear multi-dimensional mapping. Results show that al-
ready in the very beginning there seems to be a certain extent
of encoding with errors significantly below 1.0. However, this
results merely from the low versatility of actions in the begin-
ning. Goal babbling initially chooses actions close to a single
posture since it is not sufficiently trained yet. The outcomes
of such locally distributed postures can to a limited extent be
predicted with the randomly initialized self-detection. After
approx. 50 epochs the values stabilize around 0.2 which means
that 80% of the actual effector-position’s variance can be
explained by the internal representations. At later stages there
is a minimal increase of the error values which is because goal
babbling learns to use more and more different and wide-
spread postures. Hence, the population gets less local and
harder to describe due to non-linearities. Latent Goal Analysis
after all succeeds to learn the robot arm’s forward function
from joint angles to effector position by just using the saliency
reward. We additionally investigated the encoding by checking
what different coordinate axes in the learned representation
encode. The blue line in Fig. 5b shows the prediction of the
effector’s top/down coordinate from just the highest variance
principle component of the internal representation. Low errors
indicate that this axis indeed encodes top/down movements.
If LGA should learn a goal representation that describes
goal-directed reaching, then the extracted goals xˆ∗ should
encode the object position o. This could seem simple because
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the object location is already directly encoded in the context
c. However, this variable still needs to (i) be identified as the
relevant one among other entries (noise and previous hand-
position) in the context, and (ii) set into the right relation (i.e.
orientation, shift, scaling) to the self-detection. In particular
at later stages of learning in our experiment the own hand-
position strongly correlates with the object position due to
goal-directed reaching, so that keeping track of the right
variable is far from trivial. Results in Fig. 5c show that at the
time of initialization the object position is not at all encoded
in the goal-detection. Then, the strongest principal component
of xˆ∗ quickly coincides with the top-down axis of the object
position (blue lines). Few epochs later, the goals’ 2D values
(red lines) do largely encode the actual object position with
errors around 0.05.
Results so far show that the robot’s hand position and the
object position are indeed found as representations for self
and goals. In order to check how well they fit together (i.e.
whether they are in the right geometric relation inside the
observation space), we checked the behavior generated by
goal babbling as a result of both abstractions. In order to
perform an analysis that excludes exploratory noise (to check
the representations themselves) we evaluate the combination of
goal-detection hˆ and inverse model g (learned based on fˆ ). The
function g(hˆ(c)) suggests actions a for any context c. Hence
we can check those actions and see whether they correspond
to a reaching act towards the object position encoded in c.
We counted for the contexts within each epoch how often the
actions led to a contact of either hand and object, or the whole
arm and the object (based on the geometries and sizes in Fig.
4(a)). Results in Fig. 5d show that learning rapidly seeks for
contacts of arm and object first, and shortly later establishes a
100% contact rate of the robot’s hand and the object. Example
performances shown in Fig. 5a thereby give an explanation
for the not perfectly accurate relation between self-detection
and actual effector position despite 100% contact rate: There
is not need to encode the “tool-center” position of the hand
– as it is usually done in robotics due to the lack of more
adaptive representations. Rather, our model learns to contact
objects close to the shoulder with the inner part of the effector,
while far away objects are contacted with the outer part of the
effector.
C. Discussion
Latent Goal Analysis together with goal babbling indeed
produces representations as well as inverse models that corre-
spond to goal directed reaching in this experiment. Remark-
ably, all of this is bootstrapped from a task-unspecific reward
based on visual saliency as a sole original learning signal.
Abstractions bootstrapped by LGA are then used as self-
supervised learning signal for goal babbling. This experiment
therefore has a dual finding: Firstly, we show that saliency as
an information seeking reward results in goal-directed reaching
behavior as seen from a distal perspective. While it had been
reported that saliency can account for self-detection [51] of
the own hand, we are not aware of studies also showing
goal-directed behavior as a direct consequence. Secondly, we
find that this information seeking reward together with Latent
Goal Analysis can account for the emergence of internal
self and goal representations (proximal perspective) as they
are typically preprogrammed in robotics, and pre-supposed in
computational neuroscience of internal models.
VI. DISCUSSION
The autonomous development of goals is a fundamental
issue in developmental robotics. This paper has proposed
a detailed conceptual framework and a mathematical op-
erationalization for agents to learn goals themselves. Our
main argument therefore is to consider goals as high level
abstractions of lower level mechanisms of intention such as
reward and value systems which themselves could origin from
either external rewards or intrinsic motivation measures. We
emphasized the need to consider and learn goals alongside
with self-detection of the own actions’ outcomes. Both can
then be compared in a common space. We suggest that
goals and outcomes together can be learned by considering
them as latent variables (i.e. abstractions) that can explain an
observed or expected future intrinsic or external reward. Our
computational approach Latent Goal Analysis operationalizes
this thought. We have therefore shown the universal existence
of the transformation from rewards to goals.
We have shown two very different experiments with this
learning formulation: On the one hand a concrete task that is
already specified by external rewards, and for which LGA can
learn goals as very compact and practically useful represen-
tations. On the other hand we have shown that considering
mere visual saliency as a generic, task-unspecific information
seeking reward to be processed by our framework leads to
abstractions of self and goals, that ultimately lead to goal-
directed reaching behavior. In doing so we have not only
shown what those abstractions encode, but have already cap-
italized on them for self-supervised motor learning and goal
babbling. We think that these very complementary two cases
highlight the generality of our conceptual and mathematical
approach. Of course, it will need more examples in future
research to substantiate this claim. For that purpose, we think
that our work does indeed widely open the door for further
investigations for instance about social learning scenarios [13]
or also other measures of intrinsic motivation [5], [53].
In particular the case of intrinsic rewards gives rise to
interesting questions on a more general cognitive science side.
In the case of our saliency experiment the robot does not
start with any particular task semantics. Rather, its generic
information seeking leads to goal-directed behavior. The nov-
elty in our study is thereby that this behavior is generated
and accompanied also by goal representations of what the
agent is going for, which is often seen as the crucial feature
of intentional action [54]. Are these goals the robot’s “own”
goals? We hope that our work stimulates discussion around this
issue, and can provide more detailed answers of how infants
become intentional agents having their own goals, and robots
being able to have theirs, too.
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